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IJTIHAD INSTITUTIONS:
THE KEY TO ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY BRIDGING
AND BALANCING POLITICAL AND
INTELLECTUAL ISLAM
Adham A. Hashish*
“Be conscious of God,
And speak always the truth.”1
Religion is a timeless culture in the Middle East.  This article
interprets Islam not only as part of the problem of democracy in the
Middle East, but rather part of the solution.  It proposes a formula of
checks and balances that has its origins in Islamic history.  In order to
introduce this topic, first, I will focus on three stories; second, I will tell
some history; and third, I will make my argument.
Wikipedia, a free online encyclopedia, is a common source of
information.  Even some scholars cite it.  In that sense, it probably con-
fuses and misleads researchers.  Consider a search of “Ijtihad” and
“Ijthad”, two pronunciations for the same word.  The encyclopedia re-
directs the searcher to two different topics; first is “Ijtihad” and the
second is “jihad”.  These two concepts wholly differ from each other.
This search outcome is a brief example of common western mispercep-
tions of fundamental concepts in Islam.
In his recent speech to the Muslim world, President Barack
Obama described the two institutions that hosted him, Al-Azhar and
Cairo University, as a representation of “the harmony between tradi-
tion and progress.”2  He emphasized that the “partnership between
America and Islam must be based on what Islam is, not what it isn’t.”3
* Assistant Professor of Law, Alexandria University Faculty of Law; former
judge, Egyptian Conseil d’Etat; S.J.D candidate, University of Kansas School of
Law; LL.M., George Washington University School of Law; LL.M., Ain Shams Uni-
versity Faculty of Law; LL.B., Alexandria University Faculty of Law.  He can be
reached at adham.hashish@alexlaw.edu.eg. The author wishes to thank Profs.
Michael Hoeflich, Karen Nordheden, Awad Mohamed, Raj Bhala, and Fathalla Al-
Meswari for their encouragement, as well as Slade Bond for his invaluable
comments.
1 Qur’an, 33:70.
2 Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks by the President on a New Beginning
(June 4, 2009) (transcript available at the White House website, http://www.white
house.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-
09/).
3 Id.
61
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This exited the audience in two ways.  First, Obama acknowledged civ-
ilization’s debt to Islam which paved the way for Europe’s Renaissance
and Enlightenment.4  Second, Obama’s approach to democracy excited
the audience by pinpointing the relationship between elections and de-
mocracy, particularly when he mentioned “there are some who advo-
cate for democracy only when they’re out of power; once in power, they
are ruthless in suppressing the rights of others.”5  Indeed, the audi-
ence reacted to Obama’s speech as if he were there not only to bridge
the gap between America and Islam, but also to bridge the gap be-
tween their past and future.  The speech was evidence of a new trend
in the Obama administration to encourage an institutional role in
shaping democracy in the Arab world.
Soon after Obama’s speech to the Muslim world, Iran’s contro-
versial presidential election generated a debate about the future of po-
litical Islam.  Despite the controversy, though, it seems surprising that
Thomas Friedman, award-wining writer for the New York Times, com-
mented, “the bad guys are losing.”6  Only a few weeks before this arti-
cle was written, the Parties Committee in Egypt turned down a
request for official recognition of a moderate Islamic party.7  The
founder of the wasat el-Gadid (New Center) group, Abu Illaa el-Madi,
is a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood.8  Unlike the Brother-
hood, his group would allow a Christian to lead Egypt and has Coptic
Christian members.9  Which model will prevail in the Middle East, the
Iranian or the Egyptian? It depends on who will shed intellectual
bankruptcy first, the extremists or the moderates.
Much has transpired since Muslims were left to govern their
own affairs after the death of prophet Mohamed.  Muslims’ nostalgia is
particularly focused on two famous eras in Muslim history, the Rightly
Guided Caliphate Era and the Golden Age of Islamic Civilization.10
The first era is famous for the dominant atmosphere of justice and rep-
resents the rise of the first democratic political institution in Muslim
history, the historic Caliphate.  The second is famous for its advance-
ments in humanities, science, and technology, which represent the rise
of advanced academic institutions which include the influential four
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., The Losers Hang On, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2009.
7 See Mohamed El-Sayed, Party Poopers, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY, Aug. 27, 2009, avail-
able at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/962/eg7.htm.
8 Id.
9 Magdi Abdelhadi, Egypt May Allow First Islamist Party, BBC WORLD NEWS,
Oct. 6, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4316258.stm.
10 See SAYED KHATAB & GRAY D. BOUMA, DEMOCRACY IN ISLAM 155–63 (2007) (pro-
viding details about Muslim thought and the age of reason).
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schools of law (madhhabs) that continue to shape the Islamic legal sys-
tem today.
Despite common Western misperceptions, Islamic law is the
product of dynamic and diverse scholarship that deeply engages in a
critical process of argumentation.11  This dialog formed different solu-
tions to the same legal issues in a liberal environment based on the
rule of reason (Ijtihad).  However, while Ijtihad institutions left us ad-
vanced paradigms of private law, which have their equivalents in En-
glish common law, the same is not true for the paradigms of
constitutional law.  The answer to this problem has its origins in Mus-
lim history. Moreover, this approach helps explain the dilemma that
faces the Arab world right now manifested in the checks and balances
between the two wings of Islam, Intellectual Islam, which is ruled by
reason, and Political Islam, which is ruled by passion.12
This article focuses on the role of Ijtihad in building institu-
tions of Islamic democracy.  Rather than addressing the importance of
Ijtihad in general or its importance in academia, this article attempts
to emphasize Ijtihad’s importance as a main tool to empower the intel-
lectual Islam (Intell-Islam) stream to check the political Islam (Polit-
Islam) stream and balance it within a framework of Islamic
governance.
Ijtihad represents the untold story behind the big picture of
any proposal for Islamic democracy.  Both Polit-Islam, through its
main tool Jihad, and Intell-Islam, through its main tool Ijtihad, re-
11 See LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW AS CULTURE IN IS-
LAMIC SOCIETY 18 (Cambridge University Press 1989) (mentioning that “[i]n the
past, when western scholars have discussed Islamic law and the role of the qadi,
they have generally remarked on the absence of doctrinal rigor and the presence of
inordinate discretion.  That is, they have characterized Islamic law – as opposed,
say, to Anglo-American common law, European civil law, or Roman-Canon law –
as lacking a rigorous set of logical links among the various aspects of the overall
body of law. Thus, it is noted that there exists in Islamic law no general concept of
contract or tort around which judges and scholars could refine their conceptual
categories as logic or concrete examples might demand. Coupled with this, in west-
ern eyes, is the presence of and unguided discretion, for if the law lacks rigorous
standards and principles the decision of the qadi seems to depend simply on his
own feel for the equalities or his own, perhaps prejudicial, opinions of the matter”).
12 Some scholars use the term “intellectual Islam” to refer to contemporary Islam
as opposed to traditional Islam. See Mohsen Kadivar, Human Rights and Intellec-
tual Islam, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT: EXPLORING REFORM AND MUS-
LIM TRADITIONS 47–74 (Karen Vogt et al. eds., 2009).  However, I use the term
“intellectual Islam” is this paper as opposed to the term “political Islam.”  These
two main streams still shape contemporary Muslim society as they once shaped
the early Muslim state.  As political Islam (Polit-Islam) basically resorts to the
notion of jihad to get the passion and support of Muslims, intellectual Islam (In-
tell-Islam) resorts to the notion of Ijtihad to build the Muslims’ reason and culture.
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present the heart and mind of Islamic democracy.13  Polls show only
the strength of the Polit-Islam stream through measuring civil soci-
ety’s passion in the short term.  However, it is the Intell-Islam stream
that shapes civil society’s culture in the long term, through its struc-
turing of Ijtihad institutions.
The argument will be addressed in three parts in this article.
Part I focuses on understanding Islam as a culture of pursuing justice.
Early development of Islamic law mirrors culture as a phenomenon in
which pursuing ideals went side by side with appropriating realities.
Ijtihad played the major role in achieving such development.  Part II
deals with the institutional role that Ijtihad played in the early devel-
opment of Islamic law.  This includes the rise and fall of Ijtihad insti-
tutions, which applies to both madhhabs (as organizations) and Usul
(as norms).  Part III deals with the institutional role that Ijtihad could
play in contemporary development of Islamic democracy.  Following a
model of early Islamic governance, I propose a contemporary model
that is based on reviving Ijtihad institutions.  These institutions re-
present an Intell-Islam stream that could balance the dominating
Polit-Islam stream in shaping Islamic culture and ultimately Islamic
governance.
I. ISLAMIC LAW AS A CULTURE
A. Islam
Islam is not just a religion.  In fact it is a philosophy of life that
implicates activities “from performing daily prayers to fighting for so-
cial justice, from seeking knowledge to smiling to respecting nature.”14
In a few words, Islam commands individuals to pursue ideals in every
aspect of life.  However, pursuing ideals does not mean ignoring reali-
13 The term jihad is used here to mean “to struggle in the way of God” or “to
struggle to improve one’s self and/or society.” See JOHN ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE
STRAIGHT PATH 93 (3d ed. 1998).  In that sense, jihad has aspects other than the
military one.  In light of that, one may understand recent interpretations of jihad
as a civil society activism. The confusion regarding the Islamic concept of jihad
happened as some writers unknowingly have used this word interchangeably with
different words like al-harb (war). See KHATAB & BOUMA, supra note 10, at 176.
In that context, one may understand the famous hadith (saying) of the Prophet
about jihad.  Addressing his followers after returning from a battle, Prophet
Mohamed said “we return from the lesser Jihad [warfare] to the greater Jihad.”
By the greater Jihad, he means a “more difficult and more important struggle
against ego, selfishness, greed, and evil.” JOHN ESPOSITO & DALIA MOGAHED, WHO
SPEAKS FOR ISLAM? WHAT A BILLION MUSLIMS REALLY THINK 21 (2007).
14 Tariq Ramadan, Ijtihad and Maslaha: The Foundation of Governance, in IS-
LAMIC DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE: THEORY, DEBATES AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES 3, 3 (M. A. Muqtedar Khan ed., 2006).
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ties.  As the world changes, Muslims have to adapt with it.  Being a
faithful believer does not mean to resort “to a very restrictive and lazy
reading of the two sources and the related scholarly commentaries of
the great Ulama of the past.”15  Instead, faithfulness demands that
one “exerts all intellectual effort to provide solutions that are relevant
to social and political reality.”16
In this sense, pursuing ideals through understanding reality is
the main core of Muslim culture.17  In the Western world, religion
could mean “a section or compartment of life reserved for certain mat-
ters and separate, or at least separable, from other compartments of
life designed to hold other matters.”18  But, in the Muslim world, relig-
ion was never so; attempts to separate it from the state are very un-
likely to succeed.19  This is the case simply because Islam is not just a
religion.  It is a culture.20
As a cultural system, Islam has never been static.21  Cultural
systems, at certain times, could be stretched or could be limited.
Egypt’s Islam is a good example:
Rulers and opponents alike will phase their concerns in
Islamic categories. While there are some things that this
culture system will not tolerate, the point is that, be-
neath that “cosmic” level, cultural limits in Egypt (and
elsewhere) can be stretched to accommodate a wide
range of things - high inequalities or socialism, war or
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 This illustrates some scholars’ proposition that Islamic law is characterized by
the incompatibility of theory and practice.  While Aziz al-Azmeh responds to that
proposition in the context of Islamic jurisprudence, the core of his analysis applies
to Islam in general.  He argues that the problem with the proposition is that it
“ignores the real distinction between fiqha and Shari’a.: the former is the domain
of legislation, the latter is the utopia that partially inspires it in very determinate
ways that are various and open to [i]nquiry. Utopia moreover is a social and ideo-
logical fact which cannot be formally glossed and assimilated to a set of logical
contradictions between theory and practice.” AZIZ AL-AZMEH, Islamic Legal Theory
and the Appropriation of Reality, in ISLAMIC LAW: SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CON-
TEXTS 250, 250 (Aziz al-Azmeh ed., 1988).
18 BERNARD LEWIS, THE POLITICAL LANGUAGE OF ISLAM 3 (1988).
19 Id. (describing such a separation as “an unnatural aberration which in Iran has
ended and in some other Islamic countries may also be nearing its end”).
20 See generally BASSAM TIBI, ISLAM AND THE CULTURAL ACCOMMODATION OF SO-
CIAL CHANGE 7–30 (Clare Krojzl trans., 1990) (providing more details about the
relationship between religion and culture in Islam).
21 See generally id. at 8–15.
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peace, a break with the Arab world or a strident version
of pan-Arabism.22
B. Islamic Law
Shari’a is not just a law.  It is a philosophy of keeping society in
order, encompassing spheres ranging from family affairs and criminal
justice to trade and governance.23  Overall, Shari’a is a path of pursu-
ing justice.24  It is important to realize that Muslims separate law and
government.25  As law equates to pursuing justice, the government’s
legitimacy depends on its pursuit of justice.26  In that sense, one may
understand the call for an Islamic state as a call for a legal state, i.e., a
call for law.27
However, pursuing justice does not mean denying its relative
nature.  In this sense, pursuing justice through providing dynamic
readings of the sacred texts is a main component of legal culture in
Muslim societies.  Therefore, it is important to distinguish between
Shari’a and Fiqh.  While “Shari’a is the revealed and immutable path,
Fiqh represents the product of human thought and elaboration on
it.”28  However, it is more important to emphasize their compatibility
as shaping the two main forces in Islamic law.  It is Muslim scholars
who undertake the burden of keeping the Fiqh dynamic while remain-
ing faithful to the function and purpose of Shari’a. Fiqh and Shari’a
constitute an advanced science; Usul al Fiqh (principles of jurispru-
22 Fouad Ajami, In the Pharaoh’s Shadow: Religion and Authority in Egypt, in
ISLAM IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 30, 31 (James Piscatori ed., 1983).
23 SAMI ZUBAIDA, LAW AND POWER IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD 3 (2003).
24 Id.
25 NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 116 (2008) (stating
that “[h]istorically, what made Islamic government distinctive was a constitu-
tional order in which the implementation of the shari’a was the nominal raison
d’eˆtre of the state and the prime way of legitimating its use of force.  Islamic law,
understood to comprehend both the classical constitutional order and the legal or-
der that obtained under it, structured private legal relations as well as relations
between state and citizen”).
26 See Ihsan Yilmaz, Ijtihad and Tajdid by Conduct: The Gu¨len Movement, in
TURKISH ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: THE GU¨LEN MOVEMENT 208, 210 (M.
Hakan Yavuz & John L. Esposito eds., 2003) (noticing that “[l]aw in Muslim un-
derstanding is a system of meanings and a cultural code for interpreting the
world”).
27 See FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 9.  In this context, one may understand the
critical role that classical Islamic legal opinion (fatwa) still plays side by side with
contemporary legal rule in Egypt.  This also illustrates how the Egyptian govern-
ment solves law enforcement dilemmas through approaching it from an Islamic
dimension.  Islamic cover does not only ease the law enforcement process, but also
supports its enactment with a legitimate component.
28 Ramadan, supra note 14, at 3.
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dence) ensures a sustainable practice of a systematic methodology, or
Ijtihad (rule of reason).29
C. Ijtihad
Ijtihad is not just a “technical term in Islamic Law.”30  Conven-
tional wisdom sees it as the third source of Islamic Law.31  In fact,
Ijtihad is a philosophy of pursuing development through knowledge
both in the sciences and humanities.32  It is a scientific methodology
that refers to the process of reasoning and which “essentially consists
in a deduction [istinbat] which represents a probability [zann].”33  For
example, in Islamic jurisprudence Ijtihad refers to “personal effort un-
dertaken by the jurist in order to understand the source and deduce
the rules or in the absence of a clear textual guidance, formulate inde-
pendent judgments.”34  The historical origin of this definition can be
traced back to a conversation between the Prophet and Moaz, a com-
panion who was being sent as a judge to Yemen.  The prophet ap-
proved Moaz’s intentions to put “ ‘all his energy into formulating his
own judgments’ in cases where he could find no guidance in the Qur’an
and Sunna.”35
Pursuing development through knowledge is the most impor-
tant Islamic value.36  The first verse of the Koran reads “[r]ecite.”37
This is commonly interpreted as a divine call to acquire knowledge and
29 AL-AZMEH, supra note 17, at 251.
30 See, e.g., Wikipedia Ijtihad, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ijtihad.
31 Ramadan, supra note 14, at 11.
32 See Yilmaz, supra note 26, at 217 (mentioning that “[b]ecause culture is con-
ceived as law in Muslim understanding and life, any discussion of change, trans-
formation, or renewal inevitably intermingles with discussions surrounding
ijtihad.  Thus, any new discourse is directly or indirectly a result of a new ijtihad,
which does not have to be in the field of law only, as strictly defined and under-
stood by legal modernity”).  In that sense, one may understand how some famous
Muslim scholars succeeded in mastering several branches of knowledge at the
same time.  Averroes, for example, mastered Islamic jurisprudence as well as the
sciences of astronomy, geography, mathematics, and physics. See Wikipedia Aver-
roes, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Averroes.
33 Ramadan, supra note 14, at 10.
34 Id. at 9–10.
35 Id. at 9.
36 This explains the term “jahiliyyah” (ignorance era) which refers to the pre-Is-
lam era in the Arabian Peninsula. See KHATAB & BOUMA, supra note 10, at 131.
In that context, the Prophet proclaimed “education to be the duty of every Muslim,
male and female.”  Ajmel Queresbi, Are Hopes of a Democratic Iraq Rooted in More
Than Faith?: Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Middle East, 9 J. ISLAMIC L.
& CULTURE 57, 84 (2004).
37 Qur’an, 96:1.
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to cope with the ever-changing pattern of life.38  While the divine call
addresses all Muslims, it is the scholars who are deeply burdened with
such an important task (Ijtihad).  According to one of the most famous
sayings of the Prophet Mohamed, “[t]ruly the scholars are the heirs of
the prophets, and what one inherits from prophets is not money . . .
but knowledge.”39  In that sense, scholars “have at their disposal to
fulfill the universal vocation of Islam, through a constant dynamic of
adaptation in response to the time and the context.”40  “This applies
not only to . . . theology and ethics, as one would expect, but also to the
mastery of the intricacies of Islamic law and, at least in previous his-
torical periods, of the so-called ‘Islamic sciences,’ ranging from politics
and economics to mathematics, medicine and areas of Islamic
mysticism.”41
As early Islamic culture laid stress on the role of knowledge in
developing Muslim society, scholars enjoyed a prestigious position as
custodians of change.  As long as the scholar is practicing Ijtihad, his
conclusions are rewarded, once if it is wrong and twice if it is right.42
Awarding the scholars’ pursuit of development guarantees that his
works will be well-received among Muslims.43  On the one hand, they
have no direct interest with the body politic that questions their loy-
alty to Muslims.  On the other hand, the social standing they enjoy
allows them a considerable degree of moral influence on the body poli-
tic, which chooses from the alternatives proposed by the scholars.44
38 ZUBAIDA, supra note 23, at 4.
39 Ramadan, supra note 14, at 15.
40 Id. at 14.
41 G.P. MAKRIS, ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A LIVING TRADITION 59 (2007).
42 Queresbi, supra note 36, at 73.
43 Makris concludes from the theoretical expression of Islamic discourse that
scholars’ “knowledge constitutes one of the foundations of political authority, con-
ferring on its guardians and interpreters undoubted political significance and a
central role in the process of productions of ‘orthodoxy.’” MAKRIS, supra note 41, at
59.
44 This situation continues to exist in exist in contemporary Muslim communities.
In Egypt, for example, one may find different cases that relate to different fields;
economy (payment of interest), health (organs transplant), and even dress (Islamic
veil).  Each of them “became the object of a lengthy public debate, with the press
requiring clear stands from the ‘ulama¯’.”  Bernard Botiveau, Contemporary Inter-
pretations of Islamic Law: The Case of Egypt, in ISLAM AND PUBLIC LAW 261,
269 (Chibli Mallat ed., 1993).
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II. IJTIHAD INSTITUTIONS AND ISLAMIC LAW
A. Institutions and Legal Development
Islamic law45 has developed in different stages.46  As men-
tioned before, Islamic law includes both the sacred texts of Islam as
well as the dynamic readings of scholars.  Such legal development is
the product of Ijtihad institutions.47  The term “Ijtihad institutions”
applies to the two modern meanings of institution.48  An institution is
a group of individuals or norms designed to achieve a common objec-
tive or to solve a common problem.49  Therefore, an institution could be
an organization (group of individuals) or a custom (group of norms).50
As to organizational institutions, the four influential schools of law,
Hanfi, Maliki, Shafi’I, and Hanbali, are perfect examples of organiza-
tional institutions that still shape the Islamic legal system.51 Social
institutions, including precedent and jury systems, have their Islamic
equivalents or origins.52
Early Ijtihad institutions enjoyed three main features that
deeply contributed to the legal development of early Muslim society.53
45 FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 28.
46 See TIBI, supra note 20, at 41.
47 Institutional change is not exclusive to the evolution of Islamic law.  For in-
stance, the common law also witnessed a form of institutional change through its
evolution. DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 96 (1990).  The example of the common law demonstrates that as a
system evolves it becomes more efficient and improved. Id. at 97.
48 See Institution, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/institution.
49 C. MANTZAVINOS, INDIVIDUALS, INSTITUTIONS, AND MARKETS 83 (2001).
50 Id. (noting that “it is useful to distinguish sharply between institutions consti-
tuting the rules of the game and organizations as corporate actors, that is, as
groups of individuals bound by some rules designed to achieve a common objective
(or to solve a common problem)”).
51 DEVIN J. STEWART, ISLAMIC LEGAL ORTHODOXY: TWELVER SHIITE RESPONSES TO
THE SUNNI LEGAL SYSTEM 1 (1998).
52 See John Makdisi, The Islamic Origins of The Common Law, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1635, 1635, 1731 (1999) (tracing the origins of three common law institutions—
action of debt, the assize of novel disseisin, and trial by jury—to Islamic legal
institutions).
53 These three features also participated in the political development of the early
Muslim state.  Masoud Kamali noted five conditions that must be fulfilled to es-
tablish the basis of a civil society.  He concluded that, “[t]he ulema enjoyed a par-
ticular religious and legitimate basis from which to challenge the state.  Their
economic independence from the state . . . underpinned the autonomy of the ulema
from the state. Ijtihad . . . has been another important source of the position and
authority of the ulema.” MASOUD KAMALI, MULTIPLE MODERNITIES, CIVIL SOCIETY
AND ISLAM: THE CASE OF IRAN AND TURKEY 40 (2006).  Three of these conditions
are: (1) the “relative autonomy of a societal sphere from the state,” (2), the “rela-
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The rise and fall of these institutions depended on such features.  They
include intellectual influence, institutional independence, and political
tolerance toward academia.  These three elements constitute what we
may call the academic democracy of Islam.54
1. Intellectual Influence
Early Muslim scholars believed in the importance of consis-
tency and predictability as critical features of a mature legal system.55
They established Ijtihad institutions based on systematic methodology
to meet the pressing needs of Muslim society.56  Such institutions pre-
pared a jurist to solve emerging problems presented by rapid changes
in the society.57  Generating dynamic readings of the sacred texts pro-
vided scholars with intellectual influence between the ruler and the
ruled as they proposed alternative solutions for emerging problems.58
2. Institutional Independence
Madhabbs (schools of law) were designed to keep the scholars
free from influence of the body politic.59  This institutional structure
allowed scholars to “establish their exclusivity and theoretical auton-
omy from outside powers, such as the rulers and the caliphs.”60  The
Awqaf system allowed such institutions a great financial indepen-
dence from the state.61  “Awqaf or endowments . . . were closely in-
tive autonomous access of some societal actors to the state or its elite,” and (4)
“legal and/or normative protection of societal agents and institutions.” Id.
54 See George Makdisi, Freedom in Islamic Jurisprudence: Ijtihad, Taqlid, and
Academic Freedom, in LA NOTION DE LIBERTE´ AU MOYEN AGE: ISLAM, BYZANCE,
OCCIDENT [THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IN THE MIDDLE AGES: ISLAM, BYZANTIUM AND
THE WEST] 79, 81 (George Madkisi et al. eds., 1985) (mentioning that “[i]n its es-
sence [academic freedom] . . . is the search for the truth by means of a method of
inquiry which systematically examines all the pros and cons of a given thesis . . .
[I]t applies to the two essential components of the academic community, the pro-
fessor and the student . . . Back in the Middle Ages, the terms representing these
two sides of academic freedom were supplied by concepts of Islamic jurisprudence:
the concept of ijtihad and the concept of taqlid.  Ijtihad means ‘exerting oneself to
the utmost limit’; taqlid means ‘investing with authority,’ ‘clothing with
authority’”).
55 FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 27.
56 ZUBAIDA, supra note 23, at 4.
57 Id.
58 FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 40.
59 STEWART, supra note 51, at 1.
60 Id.
61 See generally, GEORGE MAKDISI, THE RISE OF COLLEGES:  INSTITUTIONS OF
LEARNING IN ISLAM AND THE WEST 35–74 (1981) (describing the role of law of waqf
in developing the institutions of learning in Islam, the objects of the waqf, the
committee of overseers, and the endowment income).
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volved in religious institutions, which were the main beneficiaries of
charitable, khayri, endowments.”62
3. Political Tolerance towards Academia
A fair reading of Usul shows that it equally applies to private
and public law.63  Scholars were involved in discussing classical public
law issues.  “Kitab al-Kharaj” is a treatise on taxation and fiscal
problems of the state prepared by Abu-Yusuf, student of Abo Hanifah,
for the caliph Harun al-Rashid.64  The body politic tolerated academia
because of academia’s efforts to facilitate the effective functioning of
the classical Islamic state.65  More specifically, scholars provided the
state with a more predictable and stable legal system.66  They secured
revenues for the state through lawful taxation67 and provided govern-
mental works that are consistent with the system scholars built, with
“an aura of legitimacy.”68
B. The Rise
1. Madhabbs as Institutions
The eighth and ninth centuries witnessed the emergence of
madhhabs, generally termed “schools of law” in Western scholarship
on Islam.69  The main four schools of law in Islamic legal literature are
the Hanfi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali.70  These madhhabs “came to
be accepted as standard, with recognized legal traditions going back,
at least in theory, to their eponymous founders, Abu Hanifah, Malik,
al-Shafi’i, and Ahmed b. Hanbal, jurists of the eighth and ninth centu-
ries.”71  Influence of these institutions “may be seen in many areas of
Islamic social, political, and intellectual history, but the features and
62 ZUBAIDA, supra note 23, at 66.
63 LEWIS, supra note 18, at 28 (explaining that Islamic jurisprudence is termed
fiqh and “[t]he standard treatise on fiqh, almost without exception, include sec-
tions on government, and some authors devote whole works to this topic”).
64 Hamid S. Hosseini, Contributions of Medieval Muslim Scholars to the History of
Economics and their Impact: A Refutation of the Schumpeterian Great Gap, in A
COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 28, 24 (Warren J. Samuels et
al. eds., 2003).
65 FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 40–41.
66 Id. at 40.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 40–41.
69 STEWART, supra note 51, at 1. See generally Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law:
An Overview of Its Origins and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27, 67–76
(2002).
70 STEWART, supra note 51, at 1.
71 Id.
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the workings of these thousand-year-old institutions remain poorly
understood.”72
Madhhabs marked a “mature legal system.”73  As a young
scholar devoted himself to a certain school, he was “learning . . . and
committing himself to following those doctrines when it came to issu-
ing actual legal rulings.”74  Commitment to the jurisprudential frame-
work of one’s madhhab contributed to the consistency and
predictability of the Islamic legal system.75  In fact, Maliki, a school of
law, developed a case law system two centuries before English judges
were bound by precedent.76  In that system, “judicial decisions became
the practice . . . that was followed by subsequent courts and that ac-
quired regulatory force even to the extent of prevailing over dominant
legal opinions within the Maliki school of law in the latter half of the
fifteenth century.”77
2. Usul al-Fiqh as Institutions
Muslim scholars developed several jurisprudential institutions
in order to provide society with a dynamic platform of conflict resolu-
tion.78  They affirmed that geographical and historical contexts could
lead to different legal judgments on the same question.79  These insti-
tutions are applications of the main science developed by the schol-
ars.80 Usul al-Fiqh allowed Muslim scholars to develop norms, rules,
and doctrines to meet the pressing needs of Muslim society.81 Such
rules still exist in contemporary Muslim states, but are not limited to
personal affairs, as some might imagine.  The Supreme Constitutional
Court of Egypt still cites Usul al-Fiqh when it decides modern eco-
nomic and social issues.82  Egypt’s Conseil d’Etat (Administrative
Courts system) was established from a comparative design with Is-
72 Id. at 2.
73 FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 27.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Makdisi, supra note 52, at 1635.
77 Id. at 705.
78 See ZUBAIDA, supra note 23, at 4.
79 Ramadan, supra note 14, at 16 (giving the example of Shafi’i who modified
some of his legal judgments after traveling from Baghdad to Cairo).
80 Abudullahi A. An-Na’im, A Theory of Islam, State, and Society, in NEW DIREC-
TIONS IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT, supra note 12, at 152.
81 See generally Abdal-Haqq, supra note 69, at 50–67 (explaining the methodolo-
gies and braches of fiqh).
82 See Shannon M. Roesler, Modern Legal Feform in Egypt: Shifting Claims to
Legal Authority, 14 CARDOZO. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 418–28 (2006).
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lamic origins that go back to the Mazalim jurisdiction.83  As mentioned
before, recent studies propose Islamic origins to some English common
law institutions.84
Discussing Islamic law paradigms goes beyond the scope of this
article.  However, three examples could explain the situation.  They
belong to criminal law, administrative law, and constitutional law
within Islamic jurisprudence.  The theft paradigm is the first example.
Muslim scholars developed a wide range of strict conditions that must
be fulfilled in order to prosecute the accused for theft.85  Administra-
tive jurisdiction is the second example.  Such new jurisdiction emerged
to deal with the growing number of petitions against the actions of
state officials.86 Judicial independence is the third example.  Tradi-
tions of such independence continued to develop beyond its origins that
go back to the era of Umar, the second caliph.
3. The Fall
When scholars approached political democracy issues, it was
the turning point of the academic democracy institutions.  Some argue
that compromises have been worked out between Muslim scholars and
rulers regarding controlling discretion over private and public law is-
sues.87  However, scholarly works present several paradigms of Is-
lamic public law.  In fact, when Ijtihad institutions approach Islamic
democracy and other concerns of political thought, political tolerance
towards academia starts to dissipate.88
Regarding the increased interference of the body politic into Ij-
tihad institutions, several observations emerge.  As Professor Makdisi
noted:
83 For more details about public law in Islam and mazalim jurisdictions see Enid
Hill, Majlis al-Dawla: The Administrative Courts of Egypt and Administrative
Law, in ISLAM AND PUBLIC LAW, supra note 44, at 212, 213.  For more details
on how mazalim became institutionalized and even bureaucratized, see ZUBAIDA,
supra note 23, at 53.
84 See generally Makdisi, supra note 52.
85 MOHAMED S. EL-AWA, PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 3
(1982) (mentioning that “there is almost complete agreement on [the] definition [of
theft] among jurists, but they are not so unanimous concerning the value of the
stolen property . . . and the question of the place from which property is stolen, i.e.,
the problem of custody”).
86 See Hill, supra note 83, at 213–15.
87 “Compromises have been worked out between Sunni jurists and the Muslim
sovereigns, allowing rulers wide discretionary control over issues on public law,
such as taxation, defense, and the maintenance of public order, while the jurists
controlled private law, including trade and contracts, marriage and divorce, inher-
itance and so on.” STEWART, supra note 51, at 2.
88 See ZUBAIDA, supra note 23, at 80–103.
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Early in Islamic history, the governing powers created
the paid post of qadi, or judge, which became a means of
attempting to bring the Muslim intellectual within the
orbit of central power as a means of controlling the
masses.  Many . . . refused the post.  It was not until the
latter part of the thirteenth century that the central
power created a paid post for the mufti, the professor of
legal opinions . . . What the central power did was to di-
vide the two competences . . . and appropriate to its own
advantage the one prerogative of the Muslim intellectual
that had remained free down through the centuries.  By
a stroke of genius, of Machiavellian spirit, it stripped
him of his last vestige of intellectual freedom: the free-
dom to express his legal opinion resulting from his prac-
tice of ijtihad in search of religious truth as he saw it,
and answerable to God alone . . . [I]t proceeded to college;
so that, under the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim intellec-
tual’s institutional protections fell within the central
power’s all-encompassing orbit.  But the main blow had
already been struck, and the irreversible damage already
done.89
The “Closure of Ijtihad’s Gate”90 is another stage of that fall.91
Either political interference or intellectual weakness led to the decla-
ration “that it was no longer necessary to practice ijtihad.”92  Overall,
“Muslims were moving further from the ‘Golden Age’ of the Prophet
and his immediate successors, [and] things were going into decline.”93
89 Makdisi, supra note 54, at 86–87.  The same situation continues to exist in con-
temporary Muslim society.  The ambiguous attitude arising from changing posi-
tions of the great Ulama of al-Azhar University towards the 1979 law of personal
status “Jihan law” and the implementation of Islamic penal law in Sudan is best
understood under this analysis. See Botiveau, supra note 44, at 266.
90 Closure of the gates of ijtihad is an expression that refers to cessation of inde-
pendent interpretation and “the concomitant institutionalization of taqlid, or blind
following, as it is most commonly referred to, has led modern observers, Muslim
and non-Muslim alike, to the conclusion that Shari’a is doggedly impervious
change.”  Sherman A. Jackson, Shari’ah, Democracy, and the Modern Nation-
State: Some Reflections on Islam, Popular Rule, and Pluralism, 27 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 88, 90 (2003).
91 “The so-called ‘closure of the gate of ijtihad’ precisely attempts to put an end to
the process of legal innovation in favor of a fixed corpus juris established by the
founders.” ZUBAIDA, supra note 23, at 43.
92 Ramadan, supra note 14, at 14.
93 MAKRIS, supra note 41, at 43.
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This “had to do more with the disintegration of political institutions
rather than with the decline of legal standards.”94
However, the fall of Ijtihad institutions and the closure of Ij-
tihad gates did not signify the complete disappearance of Ijtihad prac-
tices.  Scholars had to fulfill their duty to Muslim society if not through
organizations, then as individuals.95  Of course, scattered efforts by in-
dividuals do not have the same strength of institutions.  In Egypt, for
example, Kamal Abu al-Magd, a professor of law at Cairo University
and ex-minister, believes that “contemporary Egyptian reformers do
not belong to any specific organization, but constitute an ad hoc group
of people with similar ideas who work on the same issues and consult
each other’s publications.”96
Egypt’s major legal developments are efforts of individuals
rather than achievements of institutions.  Muhammad Abduh
(1849–1905) studied theology and Islamic sciences at Al-Azhar Univer-
sity in Cairo.97  “Abduh’s ‘modern’ and moderate views on Islam car-
ried him to the office of the Grand Mufti, the highest Egyptian judge
[at the time], and to membership of the legislative council of the coun-
try.”98  The School of Magistrature in Egypt, which was founded in
1907 according to a project already formulated by Abduh shortly
before his death, produced a codification of civil law.99  Such codifica-
tion was classified and presented like a Western code.100  It contained
the rules of Islamic law that best adapted to social change.  “The first
Egyptian law on personal statute was promulgated in 1920 on this ba-
sis.”101  Abd al-Razaq al-Sanhori (1895–1970) also played a remarka-
ble role in developing the legal system, not only in Egypt, but also in
the Arab world.  He is “remembered today as the principle architect of
the present civil codes of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and the commercial
code and other basic legislation of Kuwait.”102  Viewing Islam as cul-
ture and civilization,103 he “attempted nothing less than to develop a
94 Id.
95 Ramadan, supra note 14, at 14 (mentioning that “[t]he doors of ijtihad have
never been closed . . . a declaration such as this, by its very nature, is against
Islam . . . [i]jtihad . . . is fard kifaya, a collective responsibility”).
96 MAKRIS, supra note 41, at 189.
97 Id. at 178.
98 Id.
99 Botiveau, supra note 44, at 266.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Enid Hill, Islamic Law as a Source for the Development of a Comparative Ju-
risprudence, in ISLAMIC LAW, supra note 17, at 146.
103 Id. at 149.
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comparative legal ‘science’ within which Islamic law was
incorporated.”104
III. IJTIHAD INSTITUTIONS AND ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY
A. Institutions and Political Development
Scholars’ role in advancing the Islamic legal system was not a
mere academic work.  Their position as heirs of prophets inaugurated
them as custodians of change.  However, the change they brought was
not delivered by occupying the body politic.  They established Ijtihad
institutions that stood as think tanks, conducting research and engag-
ing in advocacy on behalf of Muslim civil society.105  Despite being
non-political entities, maddhabs gained support from the public.  This
allowed them to devote a great deal of thought and attention to sensi-
tive constitutional issues.106  In this context, they discussed “features,
functions, and also ailments of the body politic—the nature of sover-
eignty, how it is acquired, how it should be exercised; the characteris-
tics of good and bad governments; and, in general, the relations
between the ruler and the ruled.”107
In that sense, one can read Islamic governance as a product of
two balanced streams: Polit-Islam and Intell-Islam.  While the Polit-
Islam stream guarantees keeping Muslim community (umma) in static
unity, the Intell-Islam stream guarantees that this static unity adopts
with the changing world.  In light of this, one may understand several
intellectuals in the Arab world who view jihad as an arena for more
reform and involvement in today’s civil society.  This is the same con-
cept of jihad that Polit-Islam once used to direct civil society activists
to Afghanistan during the 1980s.108  Accordingly, one may illustrate
the democracy crisis that faces some contemporary Muslim states in
light of this reading of Islamic governance.  Such crisis can be summa-
rized as an absence of balance between the two streams.
104 Id.
105 KAMALI, supra note 53, at 40.
106 LEWIS, supra note 18, at 25.
107 Id.
108 Ironically, the political use of the notion of Jihad has a long story in Muslim
history.  As Esposito and Mogahed noted, “Jihad, which in the Quran means ‘to
strive or struggle’ to exert oneself to realize God’s will, to lead a virtuous life, is
sometimes referred to as the sixth pillar of Islam, but it has no such official status.
Jihad is not associated or equated with the words ‘holy war’ anywhere in the
Quran.  However, historically, Muslim rulers, with support of religious scholars
and officials, did use jihad to legitimate wars of imperial expansion.  Early ex-
tremist groups also appealed to Islam to legitimate rebellion, assassination, and
attempts to overthrow Muslim rulers.” ESPOSITO & MOGAHED, supra note 13, at
17.
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B. Early Islamic Governance
After the death of the Prophet, the appointment of Abu¯ Bakr as
his successor in the guidance of the Muslim community represents the
establishment of the “the first and by far the greatest and the most
important sovereign institution in Islamic history” of the Caliphate.109
The Rightly Guided Caliphate is the period that witnessed “governing
of the Islamic community by four khalı¯fas [caliphs] . . . all of whom
were numbered among the initial and faithful followers of the Prophet.
During the leadership of the first three the great expansion of Islam
began.”110  However, it is second caliph, Umar, who sharply clarified
the nature of this institution, its powers, and its limits.111  In early
days of his regime, he refused to be addressed as the “caliph of Allah,”
the deputy of God.112  More than eliminating the theocratic nature
from the growing institution, he set a constitutional custom regarding
appointment of the caliph.  Right before his death, he appointed a com-
mittee of six people to choose the next caliph from among them.113
However, the most important achievement of Umar is his con-
tribution to the Islamic jurisprudence.  He earned a legacy as “the
Great Jurist” in light of his unique practice of Ijtihad.  Such practices
are still cited by many Muslim intellectuals who call for reforming Is-
lamic law through contextual reading of sacred texts.  More interest-
ingly, while he was the caliph, Umar assured separation between
Polit-Islam institutions and Intell-Islam institutions on several occa-
109 LEWIS, supra note 18, at 44.
110 MAKRIS, supra note 41, at 21.
111 See generally Muhammad Khalid Masud, The Changing Concepts of the Cali-
phate – Social Construction of Shari’a and the Question of Ethics, in NEW DIREC-
TIONS IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT, supra note 12, at 187, 187–205 (describing the history
of the institution of the caliphate).
112 LEWIS, supra note 18, at 44 (explaining the story that “[w]hen Abu¯ Bakr suc-
ceeded the Prophet, he was called Khalı¯fatu Rasu¯l Aa¯h, the deputy of the prophet
of God. Then Umar succeeded [of perhaps replaced] him . . .  A man came to hear
Umar and addressed him as Khalı¯fat Alla¯h, deputy of God.  Umar cursed him, and
said: ‘That is David.’ The man then called him Khalı¯fatu Rasu¯l Ala¯h, deputy of the
deputy prophet of God, and Umar said:  ‘But that was Abu¯ Bakr, who is now dead.’
So the man addressed him as Khalı¯fatu Khalı¯fati Rauu¯l Alla¯h, deputy of the dep-
uty of the prophet of God, and Umar said: ‘That is correct, but it will grow longer,’
and the man said: ‘Then what shall we call you?’ And Umar said: ‘You are the
believers and I am your commander, therefore call me commander of the
believers’”).
113 See Tamara Sonn, Elements of Government in Classical Islam, in ISLAMIC DEM-
OCRATIC DISCOURSE, supra note 14, at 21, 23 (noticing that “Abu¯ Bakr appears to
have suggested his successor to a council of community leaders who approved the
choice (Umar).  The next two successors (Uthman and Ali) are also reported to
have been chosen by such a council”).
\\server05\productn\R\RGL\9-1\RGL103.txt unknown Seq: 18  2-FEB-10 14:13
78 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 9:1
sions.  Despite disagreeing with the outcome, Umar refused to inter-
fere with a case before one of his judges.  Umar emphasized the
intellectual independence of the judge that allowed the latter to exer-
cise his independent judgment in the case before him.  Another situa-
tion emphasized that Umar separated the ability to interpret the law
(Intell-Islam) from the authority to impose the law (Polit-Islam), and
favored the first over the second.  The story goes something like this:
Umar proposed a change in marriage laws and an old,
unknown woman in attendance stood up and challenged
him. She said, “You shall not deprive us [women] of what
God gave us.” The Khalifah [Umar] asked her to provide
support for her statement.  When she cited a Qur’anic
verse, the Khalifah [Umar] said: “The woman is right
and the Khalifah is wrong.”114
Umar also contributed institutionalizing judicial practices at
the very early moments of the Muslim State.115  His famous epistle to
Abu Musa al-Ash’ari, whom he is supposed to have designated as
Qadi, stands as a paradigm of judicial ethics and responsibilities.116
Until today, Egyptian judges received a handout of Umar’s epistle dur-
ing oath-taking ceremonies.  In the epistle, Umar repeatedly empha-
sizes the judicial autonomy issues.
Early Muslim states had their own democratic institutions that
existed and functioned to pursue ideal Islamic governance.117  Such
institutions might have a different structure, different mechanisms,
and different titles than their equivalents in modern democracies.118
However, they had the same notion of “government of the people, for
the people, and by the people.”119  In light of these institutions, there
114 Queresbi, supra note 36, at 84.
115 ZUBAIDA, supra note 23, at 41.
116 Id.
117 See generally KHATAB & BOUMA, supra note 10, at 7–92 (explaining the politi-
cal theory and notion of political participations in Islam).
118 See JOHN ESPOSITO & JOHN VOLL, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 27 (1996) (stating
that “[i]n presentation of democracy within a broad Islamic conceptual framework,
much attention is given to some specific aspects of social and political operation. In
particular, Islamic democracy is seen as affirming longstanding Islamic concepts
of consultation (shurah), consensus (ijma), and independent interpretive judgment
(ijtihad)”).
119 See FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 6 (stating that “[t]he Islamic state is preemi-
nently a shari’a state, defined by its commitment to a vision of legal order. The
state historically organized under what I shall call the classical or the traditional
Islamic constitution—a constitution that, like the English constitution, was un-
written and ever-evolving—was a legal state in both meanings of the term. The
system was justified by law, and the system administered basic government
through law”).
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has never been, either in theory or practice, the false picture that por-
trays Islamic government “as a system in which the ruler is an all-
powerful despot and the subject his helpless slave, entirely at his
mercy.”120
Madhhabs also contributed to the Islamic governance struc-
ture. Kitab al Khraj, the “introduction to the Book of the Land Tax,”
stands as the first major statement on politics.121  It introduces “the
ruler as shepherd at considerable length.”122  It was written for the
caliph Harun al-Rashid by his chief quadi Abu¯ Yusuf.123 Abu¯ Yusuf
was a student of Abu¯ Hanifah, the founder of Hanafi School of Law.
However, the most important contribution of Madhhabs in Islamic
governance is the so-called “climate of opinion.”124  This expression re-
fers to “the coexistence and mutual tolerance” among Madhhabs that
believed in the significance of disagreement while remaining ortho-
dox.125  Malik repeatedly refused demands from Caliph al-Mansour to
allow the state to adopt Malik’s famous book (al-Muwatta) as the for-
mal doctrine of the state.126  In addition, the structure and goals of
Ijtihad institutions in general gave rise to a growing civil society that
“does not depend on the presence of sovereign and free individuals, but
on groups or communities and their institutions enjoying a significant
degree of autonomy from the state.”127  To conclude, the Ijtihad insti-
tutions planted democratic values in basic legal ideas that influenced
the civil society and, to some extent, the body politic.128
120 LEWIS, supra note 18, at 31 (concluding that “Muslim law has never conceded
absolute power to the sovereign, nor, with few exceptions, have Muslim sovereigns
ever been able to exercise such power for any length of time”).
121 Id. at 18
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 29.
125 Id.
126 See MUHAMMEAD QASIM ZAMAN, RELIGION AND POLITICS UNDER THE EARLY AB-
BASIDS 84 (Brill 1997) (noting that “[t]here are some reports . . . according to which
the caliph [al-Mansur] intended to promulgate the Muwatta’ of the Medinee jurist
Malik b. Anas (d. 179/795) as the single and uniform basis of the legal decisions in
the empire . . . Malik, for his part, remained unimpressed with what the caliph
intended . . . Malik reportedly argued that such regional diversity in legal matters
was too developed to be harmonized or regulated.”) Id.
127 KAMALI, supra note 53, at 40.
128 See generally KHATAB & BOUMA, supra note 10, at 93–128 (explaining demo-
cratic values in some basic Islamic legal ideas.  For example, some ideas relate to
human relations: respect and compassion; property: trusteeship and charitable
trust; human life: privacy and human dignity; work: labor and industrial relations;
economics: free market and commercial integrity).
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C. Contemporary Islamic Governance
One missing piece of the picture could illustrate the democracy
crisis that Arab countries face.  These countries have different political
systems, political forces and political institutions.  However, they all
share one critical deficit to any democracy—a fragile civil society.129
As Islam is the main component of culture in these states, any “Is-
lamic” stream will easily gain popularity.130  In the political game, be-
ing “Islamic” is a very strong asset and probably the winning card.131
Islam represents “the most widely intelligible formulation of ideas, on
the one hand of social norms and laws, on the other hand, of new ideals
and aspirations.”132  However, being “Islamic” cannot be briefed in a
mere slogan or name for a party or group.133  Without an intellectual
input that reflects the society’s needs, political entities will continue to
impose their custody on the people according to these entities’ agenda,
not the society’s agenda.134  While this basically applies to the Polit-
129 For more details about contemporary civil societies in Muslim countries, see
KAMALI, supra note 53, at 254–58 (explaining contemporary civil societies in Mus-
lim countries).  Kamali noted that:
Some state organizations, such as the military, the police and the
bureaucratic apparatus, hold greater importance in Muslim
countries than do their counterparts in ‘the West’. . . . In many
Muslim societies, other state institutions and organizations, such
as the welfare system, the judicial system, the constitutions of
the political system, and so forth, have not been developed very
far, having been pushed back by organs of state such as the mili-
tary, and by an authoritarian elite.
Id. at 254–55.
130 That explains “the increasing tendency of political parties to raise religious
issues” in the secular Turkish Republic where legal separation of religion and
state is clear. LEWIS, supra note 18, at 4.
131 See ALAN RICHARDS & JOHN WATERBURY, A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MID-
DLE EAST 342 (3d ed. 2008) (providing the experiences of Algeria, Palestine, Iraq,
and Egypt as examples).
132 LEWIS, supra note 18, at 5 (concluding that “as recent events have repeatedly
demonstrated, Islam provides that most effective system of symbols for political
mobilization, whether to arouse the people in defense of a regime that is perceived
as possessing the necessary legitimacy or against a regime which is perceived as
lacking that legitimacy, in other words, as not being Islamic or, perhaps, as having
forfeited that legitimacy by no longer being Islamic.”).
133 FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 113.
134 RICHARDS & WATERBURY, supra note 131, at 323 (stating that while civil soci-
ety “has grown in size, complexity, and voice,” political Islam groups “have cap-
tured a significant part of it, but whether they merely reflect a high level of
frustration among the citizenry as opposed to a genuine quest for an Islamic state
is moot.”).
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Islam groups, contemporary regimes are not exceptions to this rule.135
The most famous example is the 1980 constitutional amendments in
Egypt.136
Noah Feldman argued that scholars, through their lawmaking
authority, practiced powerful and effective checks on the ruler in class-
ical Muslim states.137  During the Ottoman Empire’s economic re-
forms, he argues, adopting codes of law, rather than the common law
of Shari’a, removed an effective lawmaking authority from the hands
135 In the same context, Ihsan Yilmaz distinguishes between state-generated Ij-
tihad (which might end up in civil disobedience) and civil Ijtihad (which may cre-
ate postmodern fragmentation as a result of micro mujtahids). Yilmaz, supra note
26, at 208–09.
136 For more details, see Patricia Prentice, Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution,
Arab-West Academic Papers, available at http://www.arabwestreport.info/AWRpa-
pers-fulltext.php?report_id:1 (mentioning that “the 1923 [mis] Egyptian Constitu-
tion did not contain any provision requiring deference to [Shari’a] . . . [Then] [i]n
1970 the government made an important gesture towards the Islamic groups call-
ing for governance according to [Shari’a]. When the new Constitution was adopted
in 1971, Article 2 states that Egyptian legislation should be consistent with Is-
lamic legal norms, and ‘the principles of the Islamic [Shari’a] shall be a primary
source of legislation’ (emphasis added)). Id. at 10–11.  However, “[i]n [M]arch
1980 the shari’ah was made the main source of legislation through a plebiscite
(emphasis added).” See R. HRAIR DEKEMEJIAN, ISLAM IN REVOLUTION: FUNDAMEN-
TALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 81 (Syracuse University Press 1995).  Another amend-
ment that took place through the 1980 plebiscite should be mentioned.  “Article 77
of the revised Constitution was particularly interesting since it had the effect of
making Sadat President for life.” See MOHAMED HEIKAL, AUTUMN OF FURY: THE
ASSASSINATION OF SADAT 215 (Andre Deutsh 1983). Overall, “[Sadat] not infre-
quently made use of the plebiscite to change the constitution or to alter the rules of
the system and in 1980 when he changed the constitution to permit himself an
unlimited number of six-year terms in office.” See RAYMOND A. HINNEBUSCH, JR.,
EGYPTIAN POLITICS UNDER SADAT 79 (Cambridge University Press 1985).  In his
book “The Ulama in Contemporary Islam,” Professor Muhammed Q. Zaman
clearly notes that “[a]s part of the effort to seek the favor of Islamic groups and the
‘ulama and to mobilize them against the regime’s Nasserist and socialist oppo-
nents, Sadat’s new Constitution of 1971 had declared that the principles of the
shari’a were to be ‘a principal source of legislation’ in the state.  A constitutional
amendment in 1980 went further, recognizing the shari’a as ‘the principal source
of legislation” (emphasis added). See MIHAMMED QASIM ZAMAN, THE ULAMA IN
CONTEMPORARY ISLAM 146 (Princeton University Press 2002).  Article 2 of the 1971
Egyptian Constitution reads that “the Islamic Shari’a is a principal source of legis-
lation.”  In 1980, the same Article was amended to read: “the Islamic Shari’a is the
principal source of legislation.”  While the legal jurists debate as the importance of
amending Article 2 from “a” to “the”, one may not ignore that Article 77 is also
amended, in the same referendum, allowing the re-election of the president for
other terms rather than two. EGYPT CONST. part I, art. 2.
137 FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 6.
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of scholars.138  In Iran, “instead of restoring the balance between the
ruler and scholars, he sought to merge these two separate institutions
under a single supreme jurist-ruler” despite the revival of scholars.139
In this context, the modern legislature, he proposes, can undertake the
lawmaking and achieve balance through effective checks on the
ruler.140
To a great extent, Feldman approached the core of the problem.
However, he missed one important dimension when proposing the so-
lution.  It is true that the scholar’s role is the missing piece of the pic-
ture that portrays how Islamic rule of law worked in early Islamic
governance.  However, their role cannot be abbreviated in lawmaking
authority.  Their contribution in the lawmaking process should be seen
as ability rather than an authority.  Their engagement with the civil
society allowed them to be law-makers and law-takers at the same
time.141  This allowed Muslim civil society to check the ruler and chal-
lenge governmental abuses.  This could not take place in the absence
of the institutional framework that scholars developed, both in an or-
ganizational and a social sense.  Such institutional framework that
hosts the Intell-Islam stream could stand side by side with Polit-Islam
and check the reasonableness of its actions.
Again, Egypt is a good example that could illustrate the pic-
ture.  Anwar Sadat’s regime (1971–1981) witnessed the rise of Polit-
Islam discourse by both Islamists and the political system.  “Sadat em-
ployed Islamic symbols and rhetoric generously.”142  This includes re-
ferring to himself as the “believer-president,” releasing Muslim
Brothers from prison and allowing them to function in public life, and
describing the 1973 Egyptian-Israeli war as a jihad.143  Sadat’s initia-
tives proved counterproductive as he relied on the Polit-Isalm groups
to play the role of Intell-Islam groups.  In fact, they approached the
civil society with their own agenda as any other political entity would.
They mobilized opposition for Sadat’s policies in different sectors of the
society (i.e., student unions, professional associations).  Mubarak’s
regime (1981-present) spent considerable amounts of time and
effort to curtail Islamist involvement in civil society.  While
succeeding in that task to a great extent through security insti-
tutions, it has left civil society vulnerable without an Intell-Islam
138 Id. at 7.
139 Id. at 11.
140 Id. at 12.
141 Recently, voices in Iran, even among clergy, suggest that scholars should re-
treat to their madrasas, “where they enjoy some comparative advantage.” RICH-
ARDS & WATERBURY, supra note 131, at 322.
142 ESPOSITO & VOLL, supra note 118, at 174.
143 Id.
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shield.144  Despite Mubarak’s call for “renewal of Islamic discourse” on
several religious occasions, no serious steps were taken to encourage
Intell-Islam to institutionalize145 or even to protect its individuals
from judicial claims brought by Polit-Islam groups.146
Absent an institutionalized understanding of what Islamic law
stands for, formal institutions in Egypt have to make hard choices.
The Executive branch’s proposal for constitutional amendments at-
tempts to emphasize citizenship, instead of Muslimship, as a base for
functioning on the political stage.  Amending the constitution, how-
ever, has not weakened the Muslim Brotherhood’s standing among the
people.  The Legislature tries to approach Islamic law with a compara-
tive methodology.  But the calls for “codification of Islamic law,” or
even “Islamisation of Egyptian law,” still easily gain public support.147
The Judicial branch’s chance to redefine Islamic law is much better
than the other two branches.  This is because of the classical portrayal
in Muslim literature of the judge as a person who has knowledge and
practices Ijtihad.  However, Egyptian judges are restricted by the lim-
ited intellectual proposals and unlimited public skepticism towards
governmental interference into the judiciary.  Overall, without enough
public support, one may question the future applicability of these
choices.
It is not hard to link the democratic crisis in Arab countries
with the “Rule of Law” dilemma.148  Law and democracy entrepre-
144 Even more, it has been “argued that the state’s increasing dominance over re-
ligious institutions, such as al-Azhar, has contributed to radicalism, particularly
the political violence of the 1990s.”  Roesler, supra note 82, at 426.
145 Some humble attempts are taking place in academia.  For example, a program
for studying the Maqasid (goals of Shari’a) was initiated between Alexandria Uni-
versity Faculty of Law and London Center of Maqasid.  However, this remains
restricted to the limited academic influence in the Egyptian society.  For more de-
tails about the program, see Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law and Ethics in Is-
lam—The Role of the Maqa¯sid, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT:
EXPLORING REFORM AND MUSLIM TRADITIONS 23, 23–46 (Kari Vogt et al. eds.,
2009).
146 For more details about prosecuting critical theologian Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd
for apostasy and other maneuvers “to use various legal rules within Egyptian
law,” see ZUBAIDA, supra note 23, at 169–70.
147 Id. at 166–70.
148 This linkage has its origins in early Muslim states.  The dueling political crisis
of Ali, the forth Rightly Guided Caliph, ended with a dramatic damage to both law
and democracy.  Ali approved to arbitrate his political dispute with Mu’awia, a
competing political leader, which ended with the rebellion of a group (Khawarij)
against Ali.  They argued that he accepted the humans’ law instead of God’s law.
Ali attempted to refute their argument by emphasizing that the Qur’an “is but ink
and paper, and it does not speak for itself.  Instead, it is human beings who give
effect to it according to their limited personal judgments and opinions.”  Eventu-
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neurs are the same in Arab countries as in western countries.  This
includes formal institutions like courts, and informal institutions like
“schools, colleges, and universities where ideas are inculcated and ex-
changed, and . . . professional offices where habits and practices are
learned.”149  Noah Feldman noted that “[i]nstitutions are no substitute
for legal ideas or values, but without them, law is homeless and thus is
not really law at all.”150  The same is true as for democracy.  Political
institutions are no substitute for the culture of democracy, but without
them, democracy is homeless and thus is not democracy at all.
CONCLUSION
As Noah Feldman noticed in his remarkable book The Rise Fall
and Rise of Islamic State, “[t]here is nothing unique to Muslims about
this active and continuing engagement with the constitutional past.
Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton continue to shape the American
constitutional traditions from beyond the grave.”151  The same is true
for Mohamed and the Rightly Guided Caliphs.  Indeed, “[t]he call for
Islamic state is a call for legal state, a call for law.”152  But, as law
cannot be invoked by a word, institutions have to do their magic.  For-
mal institutions are not the only law entrepreneurs.  Informal institu-
tions provide formal institutions with the intellectual material and
public support.  Polit-Islam pursuit, for either law or democracy, is at-
tractive and thus likely to gain public support in the short-term.  How-
ever, it is the Intell-Islam that could rationalize that support in the
long-term.
There was a time when true Islamic democracy existed.  De-
spite its life being very short and full of interruptions, Muslims still
remember it in their nostalgia.  Overall, it was the product of a bal-
anced interaction between two main powers in Islam: intellectual Is-
lam (Intell-Islam) and political Islam (Polit-Islam).  Each of them
played a remarkable role in early Islamic governance that reflects it-
self in culture, law, and, eventually, democracy. Ijtihad institutions
represent the Intell-Islam stream along Muslims’ history.  The rise
and fall of these institutions illustrate the rise and fall of Islamic gov-
ernance.  There is still a chance for these institutions to play a role in
contemporary Islamic governance. Ijtihad institutions can still redi-
rect the Jihad institutions from militants to civil society activists.
ally, after the death of Ali by the hands of a member of this group, Mu’awia headed
the state.  This ended the Rightly Guided Caliphate and started another royal cali-
phate or, in fact, kingdom. KHALED ABOU EL FADL, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF
DEMOCRACY 7–8 (Joshua Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds., 2004).
149 FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 10.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 5.
152 Id. at 9.
